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The past two years have seen a profusion of congressional scandals of all
sorts, from official corruption (William Jefferson and Duke Cunningham,
among others) to personal misconduct (Mark Foley comes to mind). Exit poll
data suggest that these scandals played a significant role in the Democrats'
victory in the 2oo6 midterm elections.1 Unsurprisingly, the new Democratic
majority has made ethics reform a priority.2 Most significantly, both the House
and the Senate have amended their rules to forbid the acceptance of gifts from
lobbyists or firms that employ lobbyists.3 However, these stricter substantive
rules will be largely meaningless without a stronger enforcement mechanism.
Who should be tasked with this enforcement role? For several reasons, the
legislative branch itself is best suited for this responsibility. First, investigations
of members by the Department of Justice and punishment of them in the
courts raise serious questions under the Constitution's Speech or Debate
Clause.4 The best reading of this Clause would protect meetings between
1. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleney & Megan Thee, Exit Polls Show Independents, Citing War, Favored
Democrats, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 8, 20o6, at P9 (finding that corruption and scandals were
either "extremely important" or "very important" to seventy-four percent of voters in
determining their votes for the House of Representatives).
2. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Passes Vast Overhaul in Ethics Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2007, at Ai (noting sweeping ethics reform proposals that have passed both the House
and the Senate); Elizabeth Williamson, Draining the 'Swamp' Is Not So Easy: Skeptics
Question Bite of Ethics Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2007, at All (noting congressional passage
of further ethics reforms).
3. S. 1, noth Cong. §§ lo8-109 (2007) (amending Senate Rule XXXV); H.R. Res. 6, iioth
Cong. § 203-208 (2007) (amending House Rules XXIII, XXV).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. i ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [senators and
representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."). I have discussed the Clause in
significantly more detail in JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY'S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE
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members and their constituents, as such meetings are a vital component of the
congressional function.' Much alleged congressional wrongdoing, however,
involves such interactions between members and their constituents (or other
interested citizens). If the speech or debate privilege indeed extends to
constituent communications, then it is not for another branch of government
to distinguish "good" constituent communications ("You should vote for this
bill because it's good policy, Senator.") from "bad" ones ("You should vote for
this bill because there's something in it for you, Senator."). To allow the
executive and judiciary to probe such distinctions would be to undercut the
very point of this broad congressional privilege.6
But even if the courts reject Speech or Debate Clause challenges, 7 it is less
than ideal to leave the executive and judicial branches with the responsibility
for policing the legislature. Doing so raises a more general separation-of-
powers concern: respect for a coequal branch of government should, at the very
least, caution the executive and the judiciary to tread lightly when probing into
the affairs of the legislature. In this vein, consider the thorny issues raised by
the search of Representative William Jefferson's congressional office.8
Finally, public disgust with congressional corruption extends well beyond
those comparatively few districts represented by corrupt members,9 which
PRIVILEGE AND DEMOcRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 87-110
(2007). See also Josh Chafetz, Privileged, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, May 31, 2006,
http://www.tnr.con-/doc.mhtml?i=wo6529&s=chafetzo 53lo6 (applying this analysis to
the FBI's search of Representative William Jefferson's congressional office).
5. See Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional
Independence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175, 184-88 (1973) (vigorously presenting a senator's perspective
that constituent communications are vital legislative activity).
6. See Thomas Jefferson, Petition to Virginia House of Delegates, in 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 322, 325-26 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) ("[Flor the Judiciary to interpose in
the legislative department between the constituent and his representative,... to overawe the
free correspondence which exists and ought to exist between them, ... to put the
representative into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of vexation, expense, and punishment
before the Judiciary, if his communications, public or private, do not exactly square with
their ideas of fact or right, or with their designs of wrong, is to put the legislative
department under the feet of the Judiciary, is to leave us, indeed, the shadow, but to take
away the substance of representation. .. ").
7. Indeed, the courts most likely would reject such challenges. See United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501 (1972) (allowing a member of Congress to be tried for bribery). For criticism of
Brewster, see CHAFETZ, supra note 4, at 1O6-07; and Ervin, supra note 5.
8. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Mr. Jefferson, Meet Mr. Jefferson, SLATE, May 26, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2142462 (suggesting that "even if William Jefferson and his
congressional colleagues do not have a winning constitutional argument, the president and
his men might do well to tread lightly" because of separation-of-powers concerns).
9. See supra note I.
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suggests that many voters consider Congress as an institution to be corrupt. A
Congress that cleaned its own house(s), rather than relying on the other
branches to police it, would go a long way toward repairing its reputation-
after all, self-restraint is generally taken as a sign of responsibility and
trustworthiness." Surely, there is public benefit in restoring confidence in our
democratic institutions.
Of course, for congressional self-regulation to be any improvement, it must
be effective. Unfortunately, the congressional ethics committees have been part
of the problem more often than they have been part of the solution." Outsiders
are not allowed to bring complaints before the committees, and members are
often unwilling to file complaints against their colleagues.' Even normal
political checks have broken down when it comes to the ethics committees -
like efficient duopolists, the two parties have simply colluded to avoid
investigations. 3 When committee members have violated this agreement, party
leaders have punished them. 4
But the failure of these committees should not lead us to give up on the
concept of congressional self-regulation. Instead, this Comment proposes a
new congressional oversight body, modeled on the British Parliamentary
Commissioner for Standards.
1o. See generally Josh Chafetz, Politician, Police Thyself, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2006, at AiS
(examining the history of Anglo-American legislative self-discipline and concluding that
congressional leaders "should prove that they are serious about governing in a more
responsible way by reinvigorating Congressional self-discipline").
ii. See generally Joe Cantlupe, Bribery Case Shows House Panel Laxness, Critics Claim, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Dec. 1, 2005, at Al (noting the inefficacy of the congressional ethics
committees); Dierdre Shesgreen, Congress Split over Handling Ethics Inquiries, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 12, 2006, at B4 ("Watchdog groups have long criticized the House
and Senate ethics committees as ineffective and toothless. That perception has only grown
in the last year ... ").
12. See Cantlupe, supra note 11 ("Under House rules, an outside person or agency isn't allowed
to make an ethics complaint. So the group [Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington] shopped around among members of Congress to see if someone was
interested in filing a complaint against [Randy] Cunningham. No one was.").
13. See id. ("The [House] ethics committee has been in political paralysis for several years as
congressional leaders have called a truce in investigating one another, critics say.");
Shesgreen, supra note 11 ("The House [ethics] panel hasn't looked into a single case in more
than a year. And while the Senate committee can't release any information about its current
activities because of confidentiality rules, its last public action against a senator was in
2002.").
14. See Shesgreen, supra note 11 (noting that the committee and subcommittee chairmen who
oversaw the 2004 admonishment of Tom DeLay were promptly removed from the ethics
committee).
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I. THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR STANDARDS
In 1995, a committee, chaired by Lord Nolan and charged with
recommending changes in the law aimed at restoring confidence in public
officials, proposed creating a Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. 5 The
House of Commons created the office that same year. 6 The office has five key
features. First, the Commissioner is not a member of the House of Commons,
but she is an official of the House. Her position was created by a single-house
resolution, not by statute, and she does not hold her office by virtue of a letter
patent from the Crown. 7 The British have long treated executive and judicial
inquiry into alleged impropriety by members as a breach of parliamentary
privilege, 8 and, to this day, no member of Parliament has ever been convicted
in the courts for bribery.' 9 Thus, any officer overseeing parliamentary ethics
had to be an officer of the House.
Second, the Commissioner's office is structured to give her a good deal of
independence and job security. Her term lasts for five years and is
nonrenewable. She may be dismissed by resolution of the House only after the
Committee on Standards and Privileges issues a report recommending her
dismissal."
Third, there is a regularized mechanism by which ethics complaints against
members can be brought to the Commissioner's attention. Importantly,
members of the general public, not just members of Parliament, can file
complaints.'
15. See 1 COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FIRST REPORT, 1995, Cm. 2850-I, at 40-45
[hereinafter NOLAN REPORT].
16. 251 H.C. JOUR. 469-70 (1995).
17. NOLAN REPORT, supra note 15, at 41-43; Diana Woodhouse, The Parliamentary Commissioner
for Standards: Lessons from the 'Cash for Questions' Inquiry, 51 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 51, 52
(1998)-
18. Thus the British, unlike the Americans, accept the broad view of parliamentary privilege
discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 4, at
90, 199 (noting that members of Parliament cannot be tried in the ordinary courts for
bribery and examining how the houses of Parliament themselves have disciplined members
who have taken bribes); Dawn Oliver, The Committee on Standards in Public Life: Regulating
the Conduct of Members of Parliament, 48 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 590, 595 (1995) (noting that
concerns of parliamentary privilege prevent external regulation of parliamentary ethics).
ig. See THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, ERSKINE MAY'S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS
AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 134-35 (Sir William McKay ed., 23d ed. 2004).
20. Id. at 483.
21. NOLAN REPORT, supra note 15, at 43; ERSKINE MAY, supra note 19, at 493-96.
22. See Woodhouse, supra note 17, at 51.
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Fourth, when a complaint is filed, the Commissioner has the discretion to
decide whether it merits investigation. If it does, she may issue subpoenas via
the Committee on Standards and Privileges. 3 Aternatively, she may reach a
settlement with the Member.' She may not, however, publish her findings
without the Committee's permission."
Finally, if the Commissioner finds additional investigation warranted, she
passes her findings on to a subcommittee of the Committee on Standards and
Privileges, which conducts further and more formal investigations, usually
open to the public. 
6
II. LESSONS FROM THE BRITISH MODEL
The British model thus manages to keep enforcement of parliamentary
ethics rules within the House, while simultaneously providing a relatively
impartial enforcer.2 7 The model of the Parliamentary Commissioner should
prove instructive to the houses of Congress in several ways.28
First, the Parliamentary Commissioner's fixed term assures a level of
independence. Once appointed, she is difficult to remove-even more so
because of the negative publicity that would accompany such an action. In
contrast, it is very easy for the majority party in a house of Congress to
reshuffle committee assignments in order to prevent zealous enforcers from
serving on ethics committees.29 Moreover, the nonrenewability of the term
means that the Commissioner has no incentive to try to please the
parliamentary majority.
Second, the fact that anyone-whether a member of Parliament or not-
can file a complaint with the Commissioner ensures that members cannot band
together to prevent all investigations, as has happened with the congressional
23. NOLAN REPORT, supra note 15, at 43-44.
24. Id.
25. See Woodhouse, supra note 17, at 54.
26. NOLAN REPORT, supra note 15, at 44-45.
27. See generally Peter Riddell, The Lords Lag Behind in Keeping Their House in Order, TIMES
(London), July 17, 2007, at 6 (noting the success of the Parliamentary Commissioner in
enforcing ethics in the House of Commons).
28. See generally ADRIAN VERMEuLE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT
SMALL 20 (2007) (noting, in a different context, that "[t]he fact that Parliament has set up a
similar body ... is a first step towards dispelling concerns about [the] feasibility [of a
proposed new congressional body]").
29. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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ethics committees." Had nonmembers been permitted to file ethics
complaints, perhaps Representative Mark Foley's improper contact with
teenage House pages would have come to light earlier.
3'
Of course, if anyone were allowed to file ethics complaints under the
current American system, the ethics committees -whose members have many
other demands on their time-would likely find themselves overburdened.
Allowing members of the public to file complaints means that wrongdoing is
more likely to be brought to light, but it also requires an official whose full-
time job consists of sorting through these complaints.32 Wading through such
complaints is a large part of the British Commissioner's job.
Finally, the fact that the parliamentary Committee, rather than the
Commissioner, is ultimately responsible for punishing misbehaving members
ensures that the Commissioner does not act as both prosecutor and judge.
Moreover, the punishment of an elected representative is an issue of some
moment, and thus it is consistent with democratic principles that the ultimate
arbiters of such punishment be other elected officials. The publicity that
inevitably surrounds the Commissioner's report serves to ensure that the
representatives perform this function with the public looking over their
shoulders.
However, this also points to several ways in which the British institutional
design could be improved for importation into the United States. The
Parliamentary Commissioner may not publish her own findings,33 thus raising
the possibility that the Committee on Standards and Privileges will simply
choose to ignore them. In contrast, allowing the Commissioner to publish her
reports would put intense public pressure on the Committee to act on them,
and a Committee determined not to act would, at the very least, have to
provide good reasons for failing to do so.
Similarly, the Commissioner has neither the power to subpoena documents
on her own, nor the power to take testimony under oath. She must appeal to
the Committee to exercise those powers on her behalf.34 This, again, might
30. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
31. See Carl Hulse & Raymond Hemandez, Top G.O.P. Aides Knew in Late 'os of E-mail to Page,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, atAl.
32. Cf. PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR STANDARDS, ANNUAL REPORT, 2005-6, H.C. 1480,
at 13, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200so6/cmselect/cmstand/
148o/14 8o.pdf (noting that, of the 129 complaints filed against specific members between
April 2005 and March 2006, io6 were not pursued, primarily because they raised issues
outside of the scope of the Commissioner's office).
33. See Woodhouse, supra note 17, at 54.
34. Id. at 52-53.
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allow a Committee majority to stifle an investigation. Publicity is undoubtedly
a partial answer to this problem as well-a Commissioner willing to publicly
denounce the parliamentary Committee for stonewalling her investigation
would likely get what she wants -but giving the Commissioner subpoena and
oath-administering powers is a fuller response.3"
Finally, the mode of appointment of the Commissioner could be improved.
As the Commissioner must be seen to transcend partisan politics, a
supermajority appointment procedure is warranted. At the Philadelphia
Convention, James Madison told his colleagues that the expulsion of a member
of Congress "was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a
quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused."
Madison proposed a two-thirds supermajority requirement, 36 which the
Convention adopted.37 A similar requirement for the appointment of the
official tasked with conducting the investigations that might lead to such
punishments seems similarly justified.
III. CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSIONERS FOR STANDARDS
To address the inadequacies of the current ethics committees, Congress
should create a Commissioner for Standards for each house of Congress,
structured to improve upon the British model. (It is desirable to have a separate
Commissioner for each house, as a single Commissioner for both houses would
raise unnecessary procedural complications. 8) Each house's Commissioner
35. See id. at 59 (proposing this reform in Britain).
36. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may ... with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel a member.").
38. The creation of a single Commissioner for both houses would presumably require a statute,
rather than an internal house rule created by resolution. There are serious questions about
the houses' ability to create rules by legislation. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial
Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 1007-10 (2007)
(arguing that a statute purporting to govern the internal rules of a house of Congress could
not be legally binding). If, as Bruhl suggests, a statute purporting to determine house rules
could be overridden by a single-house resolution, then the House and Senate could issue
mutually inconsistent, but equally binding, instructions to the Commissioner. The obvious
solution is for each house to have its own Commissioner. However, nothing should prevent
the two offices from being vested in the same person, who would follow House rules when
investigating representatives and Senate rules when investigating senators, thus avoiding
the problem of inconsistent rules.
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would be appointed for a fixed, nonrenewable term.39 The appointment would
come via a resolution of the house, passed with a two-thirds supermajority.
Each Commissioner would be required to create a regular procedure by which
anyone-whether a member of Congress or not-could bring an ethics
complaint to her attention.
A Commissioner would be obligated, first, to determine whether a filed
complaint actually asserts a violation of the house's ethics rules. 40 If it does, the
Commissioner should proceed to a preliminary investigation, during the
course of which she would have the power to issue subpoenas and compel
testimony under oath. At the conclusion of this preliminary investigation, she
may dismiss the complaint, reach a settlement with the accused member, or
conclude that further investigation is warranted. In any case, in contrast to the
British model, she would be required to publish her findings.4 If further
investigation is warranted, it would be conducted by the Ethics Committee-
and that Committee would have ultimate responsibility for determining the
proper punishment. Given the Commissioner's published report detailing the
need for further investigation, the Ethics Committee likely would encounter
significant political difficulty if it refused to take up the matter.
CONCLUSION
The institutional design laid out above would leave congressional ethics
enforcement within the houses of Congress, thus avoiding the problems with
external enforcement laid out in Part I, while simultaneously minimizing the
possibility that the Commissioners will be "captured" by those they are meant
to regulate. 42 The independence of the office, the supermajority (and therefore
39. For the House Commissioner, the term could not exceed two years, as the procedural rules
of one House of Representatives cannot bind a future House. See WM. HOLMES BROWN &
CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND
PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 162 (2003).
40. This might be thought of as the equivalent of a determination of whether the complaint
states a claim upon which relief can be granted by the Commissioner. Cf FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
41. She should, however, be allowed to redact portions of her findings if publishing them
would violate the privacy of third parties or would otherwise result in the release of sensitive
information.
42. Regulatory capture theory suggests that regulators tend to act at the behest of interest
groups seeking to maximize their own benefits, rather than in the public interest. See
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCl. 335, 335-36
(1974) ("Espoused by an. odd mixture of welfare state liberals, muckrakers, Marxists, and
free-market economists, this theory holds that regulation is supplied in response to the
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typically bipartisan) nature of the appointment process, and the provisions
encouraging publicity all lessen the possibility of capture. The Federal Election
Commission provides an instructive contrast. A 2000 New York City Bar
commission report suggested that the FEC had been captured, finding that
[m]any of the problems with the FEC are built into its basic structure,
including the even number of commissioners, the lack of a long-term
chair, and the partisan appointments process, as well as congressionally
imposed restrictions on the FEC's investigatory and enforcement
powers. As a result, the FEC is frequently incapable of taking effective
action against the major parties or their candidates.
4
1
The structure of the office proposed in this Comment avoids all of these
difficulties. It is vested in a single person in each house; the appointment is for
a significant period of time; and it possesses the power to both investigate and
publicize alleged wrongdoing. Although it does not have independent
enforcement power, its publicity power will put substantial pressure on the
committees charged with enforcement.
Ultimately, this office would serve to regularize and strengthen the
enforcement of congressional ethics, while keeping final responsibility within
Congress itself. The result would likely be an increase in public trust in the
most representative branch of our government. That, surely, is a worthwhile
innovation.
JOSH CHAFETZ
demands of interest groups struggling among themselves to maximize the incomes of their
members."). Where, as in the case of ethics regulation, the interests of one group (the
legislators) is concentrated, and the countervailing interest (the public interest) is diffuse,
capture theory suggests that the regulator will act at the legislators' behest. See Robert E.
Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright
and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 692 n.13 (2006) (suggesting that "a one-to-one
correspondence between regulatory action and the interests of large interest groups" is
evidence of regulatory capture).
43. Comm'n on Campaign Fin. Reform, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Dollars and
Democracy: A Blueprint for Campaign Finance Reform-Introduction and Summary, 55 RECORD
645, 657 (2000).
